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Summary
This paper describes four types of uncertainty confronted by decisionmakers undertaking risk
assessments. It then discusses individual and institutional responses to uncertainty; these include
both formal attempts to acquire more information, and pragmatic efforts to isolate and act upon
salient considerations. The tendency of .decisionmakers to narrow the agenda and search for a
decisive datum or metaphor is called guerilla decisionmaking. Courts oversee agency decisions by
techniques known widely in the legal community as the hard-look doctrine. This doctrine is defined,
and the case law is used to illustrate how courts insist upon identification of salient risk-assessment factors and the production of information on all four types of uncertainty.

Introduction
While risk assessments occur in many legal contexts, the dominant one is
in judicial review of administrative agency decisions. Each year, hundreds of
agency judgments on societal risks are reviewed in the courts at the behest of
parties aggrieved by the administrative choices. The courts engaged in this
review, no less than other institutions, are creatures of their environment. An
understanding of how these courts behave is assisted by recognizing that their
agendas are set chiefly by the administrative agencies whose judgments are
subject to review. Judges do no more than stake out the permissible reach of
discretionary agency choice; the law marks the limits of judicial tolerance. We
have here no models of perfection, no prescriptions for reform. Courts, in a
sense, act as predators culling out unacceptable forms of administrative behavior. Predatory oversight in the courts of appeal tells us only that some admin*This paper was prepared for the AAAS Annual Meeting, New York, NY, May 24-29,1984, Symposium on Uncertainty in the Law and Science of Health Risk Assessment, and has been updated
and revised.
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istrative decisionmaking phenotypes* are unsuited for perpetuation. Survivors,
of course, are not the best; they are only good enough, and they have characteristics that may be perpetuated in the population.
Agency decisions, as the prey in this drama, confront a variety of stresses
that influence survival rates in the courts of appeal. Among these, the dominant one is uncertainty. Uncertainty, to be sure, is rampant in the physical
and social sciences, often in ways that are alien to the legal profession which
tends to equate thoroughness of inquiry with approximation of truth. Uncertainty is a cloak of many colors, however, and lends itself to a descriptive typology distinguishing between four different types of unknowns. We will pursue
these descriptive differences in the expectation that they will lead to deeper
understanding of judicial review.
Four types of uncertainty
1 Data uncertainty
Decisionmaking under uncertainty commonly means that the decisionmaker lacks the facts to make a considered choice. The fossil-record, for example, offers a limited peek at the past; it reluctantly yields grab-bag samples,
tantalizingly incomplete, heavily skewed by geological caprice [ 11. Notwithstanding the gaps, however, the bits and pieces have been put to use to support
sweeping inferential judgments. Nothing less than the evolutionary history of
human beings has been rewritten and corrected many times [ 2 J. There is no
other choice except to suspend judgment indefinitely.
2 Indeterminacy
A second type of uncertainty arises out of attempts to answer questions that
have no answer. The obvious example comes from quantum mechanics where
we are told “it is not possible, even in principle, to know enough about the
present to make a complete prediction about the future” [ 3]. Heisenburg’s
famous uncertainty principle holds that in the subatomic realm we cannot
know both the position and momentum of a particle with absolute precision;
the more we know about one, the less we know about the other. Future behavior
cannot be predicted, only approximated by probability statements. Elsewhere
in the sciences, much investigation takes place in a minefield of presently
unanswerable questions, which are often treated as black boxes “inaccessible
to explanation” [ 4 1.
‘To pursue the metaphor, the agency decision is better viewed as an entire population, as courts
are able to disapprove selectively parts of the rationale, some of the studies relied upon, or particular techniques used. It is an authority to disapprove the antlers of the Irish Elk while endorsing
the rest of the beast. There is also some kind of Lamarckian evolution at work since courts believe,
at least provisionally, that they can change agency policy by the simple expedient of giving helpful
and advice.
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3 Nonrecurring and nonreplicabk events
A third type of uncertainty arises out of attempts to understand events that
are nonrecurring or nonreplicable. I call this historical uncertainty. Inquiries
into these mysteries suffer from fact shortages and indeterminacies but also
from information barriers unique to understanding events that come around
but once. There are observation problems; we get but one quick look, and no
chance for further verification by experimentation
[ 51. There are interpretation problems: archeologists [ 61 and historians [ 7,8] can offer only plausible
accounts of the past, faced as they are by such imponderables as where to stop,
what to exclude, and what it all means. With increasing complexity, chains of
causation become matters of opinion. Attempts to understand historical events
also illustrate that, for purposes of uncertainty standing in the way of choice,
information
overload is functionally
indistinguishable
from information
underload. Many of the rocks and debris of historical research, deserving summary rejection, mimic valuable finds and appear in the guise of something
useful. In history, the uniqueness of past events and their defiance of single
descriptions encourages us to accept a high degree of variability in accounts of
what “really” happened.
Predicting nonrecurring events returns us to the realm of the indeterminate.
The risks flow from events that have not been observed because they have not
happened. Opinions count heavily here, and those who venture an opinion are
called risk-assessors, or futurists, or soothsayers.
4 Transcientific or globalpolicy choice
Alvin Weinberg has given the name transcientific to high policy questions
that may be asked of science but are not answerable by science [ 9,101. Questions of this sort are not answerable because they require physical predictions
that cannot be made (e.g., rates of accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere)
and social choices that cannot be defended. Any choice obliges the decisionmaker to predict the unpredictable, compare the incommensurable, identify
elusive political or cultural preferences, respond to ever-changing constituencies, choose among values, and elevate one discipline over another. Uncertainty here is rarely overcome by consensus opinions of qualified experts; many
opinions count in these cases, and any sampling of opinion is bound to be
tentative as views and information are constantly changing. Decisions to wage
war, move against acid rain, or curtail the fumigant EDB are of this type. Generalized, transcientific or global policy decisionmaking is what is usually meant
by public policy decisionmaking.
The four types of uncertainty in the regulation of toxics
In regulating toxic substances, it is evident that all four types of uncertainties stand in the way of confident judgments. Any single decision confronts
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numerous

data shortages,

including unknowns

about groups exposed, routes

of exposure, patterns and practices of uses, behavior of chemicals within the
environment [ 11-141. Indeterminate questions abound, including the shape
of the dose-response curves, the relevance of animal studies, the relationship
of exposures to effects observed in epidemiological studies, and even whether
there are safe threshold levels for exposures to given substances [ 15-17 1. Historical uncertainty is rampant. Even the easy cases (saccharine is commonly
mentioned) offer a virtual blank in assessing the costs and benefits of a product used for years by over fifty million people [ 181. These problems are also
demonstrably nonrecurring in any physical sense; the sheer chemistry of the
mixtures at many of the waste disposal sites is not duplicable, for example,
leaving in its wake unanswerable questions about causes and effects
[ 15-17,19,20]. The difficulties of predicting what will happen and what to do
about it combine to make the regulation of toxics prototypical of transcientific
or global policy choices.
Individual and institutional responses to uncertainty
While uncertainty may offer sufficient grounds for not deciding, choice is
often obligatory. One reason is that uncertainty is an inevitable component of
any decision. Uncertainty must be coped with, and different types of uncertainty are solved in different ways.
For data uncertainty, one option is to suspend judgment, pending the gathering of additional facts. As individuals, we may pause to collect the best available evidence or pursue studies. Decisionmaking institutions may do this and
more; they may attempt to extend the visibility by modeling, decision trees,
and the other apparatus of contemporary rational decisionmaking [ 211. Along
the way tactical battles against uncertainty are fought with reasoned assumptions, consensus opinions, and qualified guesses. Stopped short, the search for
more information is dangerously incomplete. Carried too far, it produces the
scorched-earth excesses of formal decisionmaking.
How much additional information is required to decide is a matter of sharp
debate. An economist is likely to recommend that more facts be pursued until
the costs of collection exceed the benefits of an improved decision [ 221, A
philosopher might say that potential losers deserve at least a best-efforts
attempt to answer the open questions [ 221. Lawyers are inclined to speak in
terms of burdens of coming forward and of persuasion [ 23-251, assigning
information-producing
responsibilities to different parties under different
circumstances.
Eventually, uncertainties can be combatted only by nonrational, intuitive,
or creative models of thought. As individuals, we are walking advertisements
for resisting massive introspection and information overload. Humans are programmed to compute on the basis of limited data, to the extent of being given
“underprivileged access” to what’s going on in our minds [ 26 1. We pay atten-

tion only to considerations that jump out at us as salient, unusual, disruptive
of the normal pattern, “mismatches” in the accustomed flow of information
[ 271. This “salient consideration” mode of decisionmaking is assisted by patterned responses to uncertain, stressful, and confusing situations; we may act
by avoiding the worst case or the catastrophic outcome, adhering to past practice, striving for margins of safety, following the crowd, or isolating the manageable [ 28-301. This kind of decisionmaking involves a search for salient and
controlling factors, and the acting upon them until some better advice comes
along.
Our risk assessment institutions, too, are torn between the needs for more
study and provisional choice. On the one hand, comprehensive decisionmaking
is greedy for facts [ 31,321, and serves agency purposes of more money, staffing,
conflict-avoidance
and decision-delay [ 33 ] . Statutes such as the National
Environmental Policy Act have encouraged the extension of formal decisionmaking. On the other hand, choice in the presence of limitations is inescapable.
Agencies often find themselves obliged to shun formal analyses in favor of
more functional, stripped down, and pragmatic forms of decisionmaking. Some
agencies and advisory bodies have pursued worst case analyses [ 34-361, comparative analyses (which ask whether the universe of risk will be improved by
replacing an existing product with another) [ 18,37 1, or a strictly limited comparison of health gains with health costs. (This is called a “risk-risk” framework of regulation [ 381.) Agencies may ask questions such as whether a
tentative policy choice will be reversible later [ 391, and they may make ruleof-thumb assessments about “the relative risks of underprotection as compared to overprotection”
[ 40,411. All of this amounts to policy groping,
attempting to deal provisionally with the many uncertainties standing in the
way of definitive choices.
My name for decisional strategies that seek to isolate and act upon salient
considerations is guerilla decisionmaking. The practice seeks out the short
agenda, a handful of options, and the compelling metaphor. Characterization
of the risk (for example, as catastrophic) is often the decisive step in analysis.
Guerrilla decisionmaking is opportunistic, provisional, ad hoc, a search not so
much for crucial links in the chain but rather for obstacles that can be overcome. It is a divide and conquer strategy, one that isolates the manageable and
postpones the obscure. It is a strategy attuned to targets of opportunity, and a
search for dispositive factors. It seeks not some ideal “best” outcome, but only
one that is good enough given the multiple constraints and ever-present
uncertainty.
Under guerilla decisionmaking acceptability of risks turns not upon global
assessments of costs and benefits but upon emergence of a single, or a handful,
of “controlling” considerations that are sensitive measures of the economic,
psychological, political and legal acceptability of a given risk. These consid-
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erations, which are no mystery to writers in the field or close observers of
technological conflict, include:
1. voluntariness [ 42,43 ] ;
2. catastrophic nature [ 441;
3. comparability to natural risks [ 451;
4. universality (e.g., the widespread dissemination of PCBs, DDT and lead) ;
5. government sponsorship (swine flu is commonly mentioned);
6. vulnerability of the target group [ 46,471;
7. necessity (the example most often cited is that of fluorocarbons);
8. familiarity of the risk; [ l&48,49] ;
9. immediacy of anticipated effects [ 441;
10 de minimis nature [ 501.
While these indicators may be in conflict and do not always control outcomes,
they offer surprisingly convincing explanations for a number of well-known
policy decisions.
Hard-look

doctrine defined

The legal name that has been given to the judicial review of risk-assessment
decisionmaking is the hard-look doctrine (the term was coined by the late
Judge Harold Leventhal) [ 51-551, although it has some decidedly soft-glance
components. Courts take a hard look at agency explanations, a soft glance at
their policy choices. Distinguishing between the two is one of the great difficulties of contemporary environmental law.
It is possible to describe with some particularity ( and even to predict) [ 561
how courts will respond to administrative choices pertaining to societal risk.
Typically, a court will be confronted by industrial and commercial claimants
saying the restrictions went too far, and by environmental or health groups
claiming they didn’t go far enough. The court, usually in this order, will subject
the administrative decision and its accompanying rationale to three tests of
acceptability. First, it will read confidently the legislative charter under which
the agency is acting to make sure the prescribed decisionmaking model is followed (for example, cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness, or cost-oblivious)
[ 571.
A second crucial feature of this review is the “incessant demand’ of the courts
for “reasoned decisionmaking” [ 58-601. The indispensible requirement here
is the sufficiency of the agency’s explanation because fulfillment of the functions of judicial review is utterly dependent upon the agency being able to
explain what it did. The hard look that is taken at the agency explanation, and
often also at its justification, appears in close proximity to the soft glance that
is extended to the assumptions and policy choices bound up in the decision.
While the courts feel confident in demanding an accounting, they quickly reach
questions foreign to their expertise and beyond their competence if they quarrel with technical assumptions or second-guess a policy choice. A third impor-
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tant feature of judicial review, also having its hard-look and soft-glance
components, is the issue of procedural regularity. Courts are not at all bashful
about enforcing the procedural rules prescribed by the Congress but are attentive also to tolerating decisionmaking experimentation that may very well be
necessary for satisfactory resolution of global policy issues [ 611.
Taken together, these three ingredients of skeptical judicial oversight have
come to be known as the hard-look doctrine of judicial review. They illustrate
that the judicial function is confined chiefly to process considerations. The
courts make sure the rules of Congress are applied by agencies able to give a
reasoned defense to the outcomes they propose. It is true, moreover, that the
long roster of process rights that emerge (e.g., rights to have methodology
explained, studies disclosed, and objections answered) are not linked to the
peculiar vulnerabilities of the victims of low-level pollution or widely disseminated carcinogens. Victims have these rights, but so do the commercial entities who suffer economically from restrictions on product uses. The hard look
offers value-neutral administrative due process rights, available to polluters
and victims alike [ 551, Every user of DDT or EDB, and every unwilling consumer of them, may have a day in court.
The process-intensive features of judicial review are not surprising. The usual
reasons of institutional limits serve as strong precautions against judicial entry
into the empirical thickets and policy minefields associated with the regulation
of environmental hazards. Process, in the short run, is a kind of nonzero-sum
good where A can be favored with a procedural entitlement without exacting a
reciprocal toll from B [ 621. It is easier for the courts to recognize or invent
these “new” rights without discernible iosers than to wade into the fray with
substantive pronouncements where victory for B is understood as a setback
for A [ 631. Process rights are a popular currency among attorneys, who dominate the litigation and legislation processes, and not only for the obvious reason that more process means more work for lawyers. Procedural proliferation
also is a convenient option for any decisionmaker searching for a “correct”
outcome, or even a guiding ethic, where no substantive choice is clearly recommended. Under this view, “justice” becomes any outcome that happens to
be churned out by just procedures; it is unnecessary, in the end, to choose
between irreconcilable values.
Judicial enforcement of salient decisional criteria
Courts assume a role both in isolating risk assessment criteria and assuring
that all types of uncertainties are accounted for adequately by agency decisions. The strict reading that is given to the legislative charters is the technique
for giving prominence to certain aspects of the risk being evaluated. In this
instance, the courts forego their normal preference for process solutions but
their boldness is attributed to legislative choice.
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Several writers have pointed out that the Congress regularly departs from a
benefit-cost decisionmaking model [ 64,651. One option, which I call the costoblivious model [66], explicitly rules out the consideration of economics in
achieving the statutory objectives, such as the protection of health [ 671 or of
nonhuman endangered species [ 681. Many analysts [ 69-711 are sharply critical of statutes of this sort - the Delaney Amendment [ 72-751 is an especially
attractive target - on the grounds that no conceivable version of a rational
decision can be built on absolutes such as protecting snail darters [ 761, forbidding the introduction of all pollutants into the water [ 771, or keeping carcinogens out of the food supply [ 72-751.
Most explanations of these cost-oblivious or absolutist legislative charters
do little to rehabilitate the practice. These legislative choices may represent a
preemptive judgment representing an advance assessment of costs [ 781 that
is likely to founder on the specifics of individual cases. They may be an expression of gut-level morality [ 791 that coincidentally calls for inordinate sacrifices from those not favored legislatively. Or they may represent the leftover
choices of a simpler age before technology made it possible to detect poisons
in the range of parts per billion [ 83 1.
Another interpretation of the cost-oblivious statutes, not inconsistent with
the morality view, is that they represent the provisional elevation of a limited
question to a place of prominence on the policy agenda. Whatever the criteria
for a “best” or “complete” decision, it is not written in stone that a single
decisionmaker must make all the choices. Referrals of properly isolated questions are the norm, not the extreme, of internal agency decisions. Although the
proposition is by no means unanimous [ 811, one can think of good reasons for
asking an agency to prescribe health-based or ambient-air emission standards,
reserving for another body (perhaps the Congress itself) questions that arise
about costs of compliance. We might have greater confidence in health-based
standards of this sort because they are divorced from the politics of compliance, free from a comparison of incommensurables (posed classically by choices
between health and job losses caused by industry shutdown), and less demanding of new and untested methodologies.
This vision of a provisional, tentative, or partial referral carries with it a
perspective of public policy choice that departs from the legal norm. The dominant legal model, built no doubt on experience with limited disputes and single
answers, expects definitive resolution within a prescribed time. Public policy
choices on many topics today, including the controversial toxics (DDT, PCBs
and many others), proceed with no end in sight, a progression of partial decisions, giving way to the next partial decision built on shifting coalitions, new
information, and mosaic values. In this world, conflict is the norm, reconsideration the prospect, and choice always is provisional.
By reading restrictive charters as an expression of provisional choice courts
cooperate in the guerrilla or “salient consideration” decisionmaking agencies
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are obliged to resort to. This charter-reading responsibility also makes it possible for the courts to enforce central values - or, less elegantly, the provisional
choice of the moment - against agencies who succumb to the temptations of
massive formal analyses. The charters, and the detectable policies behind them,
often suggest a dominant approach to risk evaluation that may recommend an
outcome in a surprisingly large number of cases.
Reasoned decisionmaking

Apart from charter-reading responsibilities giving hints about the acceptability of risk, the task of judicial review is devoted mostly to improving agency
decisionmaking in the face of uncertainty. Scores of cases take up the question
of data shortages, and often result in directives for more study, investigation,
and even experimentation. The leading cases include Refs. [ 82-851. (NEPA
often is invoked for data supplementation purposes [ 8687 ] . ) Reaction to these
cases turns chiefly upon one’s normative assessment of whether the line on
how much information is enough was wisely drawn [ 22-251. The benzene case
[ 881 is one where the Supreme Court went too far by calling for the production
of data that was not practicably available.
Indeterminacies, sometimes mistaken for mere data shortages by lawyers
[ 561, are also commonplace in the case law [ 891. Predictably, the courts require
disclosure of those questions that cannot be answered and recognition of the
limitations of the methodologies employed [ 891. This disclosure obviously may
invite disagreement and questioning of the agency opinions.
Historical uncertainties, sensitive as they are to choice of methodology, are
also dealt with in the course of hard-look review by requiring disclosure, including assumptions, authoritative studies, or qualified guesses serving as the foundation of the analysis [ 90 ] . While the choice of assumptions in, say, cancer
research, ultimately may represent value judgments, they are judgments that
are closely held, confined to the inner sanctum, and hardly open to repudiation
by the public at large. In these instances the hard look may function to force a
debate among experts by requiring the agency to answer this plausible objection or explain why it dismissed that credible opinion or chose this assumption
over that one. Few scientists realize that the aura of credibility customarily
associated with reports of panels of the National Academy of Sciences, to mention but one example, means that the agencies must give plausible explanations for departing from this advice [911.
At the level of transcientific policy choices, courts require explanation of the
salient considerations and the basic policy choices that made risk A acceptable
and risk B unacceptable. Because these choices depart from a scientific model,
where technical analysis and professional opinion hold sway, and approach the
world of pure political choice, one is likely to find that judges are vigilant to
expose the value choices that may be revised by political second-guessing [921,
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and to enforce rights of public participation [ 931. The Supreme Court’s decision in the PANE case [ 941, excusing disregard of psychological effects from
the start-up of the reactor at Three Mile Island, is open to criticism as being
insufficiently sensitive to the fact that “correct” global risk assessment should
give weight not only to technical consensus but also to popular opinion [ 951.
Conclusions
While the agencies grapple with uncertainties, the courts grapple with agency
methodologies. The result is a coevolutionary normative commentary on the
agency treatment of data shortages, indeterminacies, historical uncertainties,
and transcientific policy judgments. Courts also oversee choices that are made
on fact-gathering and risk acceptability. Statutory charters, and their less
explicit purposes, are used to identify salient features of a risk that suffice to
point the way to provisional choice. Judicial review also serves to open process
doors so that losers may be heard and winners kept insecure in conflicts perceived as having no end and few right answers.
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